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THE DIVISION OF LABOUR:
AN EXAMINATION OF
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS©
BY GARY SVIRSKY*
Under Canadian and American labour law, organized
workers must be divided into bargaining units. In order
to negotiate with employers on behalf of workers, these
bargaining units must be certified. This entails
receiving the approval of the appropriate labour
relations board. The author argues that this
requirement informs the outcomes of collective
bargaining. This article takes the position that
certification is a subtle method for maintaining the
existing social order and the consequent distribution of
power, without actually appearing to do so.
Certification can be understood as a tool for
fragmenting the potential power of labour's unity. The
present analysis draws on and consolidates some of the
major themes in the critical legal, sociological, and
political literature on labour/industrial relations.
Selon le droit du travail canadien et am(ricain, les
travailleurs sont diviss en unites de n.gociation. Afin
de n6gocier avec leurs employeurs au nor des
employ6s, ces 'unit6s doivent 6tre certifi6es.
Cons6quemment, cela implique I'approbation des
conseils de relations de travail respectifs. L'auteur
opine que cette exigence d6voile l'issue de la
n6gociation collective. Cet article soutient que ce
certificat reprdsente une m6thode subtile pour
maintenir l'ordre social et done, la distribution du
pouvoir, sans quecela apparaisse au premier abord. La
certification peut A-tre entendue comme un outil pour
fragmenter le pouvoir potentiel d'une unit6 de travail.
La pr6sente analyse regroupe quelques uns des thdmes
majeurs dans une analyse critique, juridique,
sociologique, et politique sur les relations de travail.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about the structure of relations between workers
and their employers. More precisely, this article is concerned with the
legal requirements for the organization of workers by unions. According
to Canadian and American law, organized workers must be divided into
bargaining units. These units require approval or certification from the
appropriate labour relations board. This requirement impacts on the
structure of relations between employers and employees. It informs the
outcomes of collective bargaining and thus the shape, format, and
texture of work relations.
The legal requirement of obtaining certification for a bargaining
unit from the relevant labour relations board presents itself as a neutral
aspect of the prevailing labour relations regime in Canada. This article
takes the position that, like many other elements of our legal system,
certification is a subtle method for maintaining the existing social order
and the consequent distribution of power, without actually appearing to
do so. In developing this thesis the present analysis draws on some of
the major themes in the critical legal, sociological, and political literature
on labour/industrial relations.
This article has two substantive sections. Part II sets out the
theoretical context for what follows. This section seeks to establish that
industrial relations are about power; that the balance of power currently
belongs to those who control the means of production; and that labour
law is concerned with preserving this social order.
Part III addresses the process of union certification. The
overarching theme here is that labour law ensures that associations
amongst workers remain fragmented. Two issues are discussed in
analyzing the specific way in which certification facilitates fragmentation.
First, certification ensures that the structure of organized labour, that is
of bargaining units, conforms to the way in which capital itself is
organized. By adhering to the imperatives of capitalism, union
organization is structured in a way that is more advantageous for
employers than for workers. This arrangement is critical in eviscerating
union power because it permits the owners of capital to retain the
advantages that attend ownership. Consequently, this places great
pressure on unions to accommodate employers in a way that is not fully
consistent with the broad interests of workers. Some of the problems
caused by this situation are most apparent in the case of small bargaining
units.
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Second, conformity to capitalist forms of organization
encourages unions to pursue a narrow gamut of issues. Rather than
focusing on widespread political issues, unions primarily concern
themselves with wage demands and other issues affecting the immediate
work environment. In this way fragmentation facilitates the
maintenance of one of liberalism's favourite ideological weapons: the
separation of the political from the economic. Unions thus function as
bureaucratic structures, partly incapable and partly unwilling to pursue
changes to the variety of social institutions that are responsible for the
disadvantaged position of workers. This, in turn, alienates unions from
their constituencies. Instead of championing justice for workers, unions
conveniently serve as managers of workers' discontent.
II. THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF LABOUR RELATIONS
The dominant and common view of labour relations is often
referred to as liberal pluralism. It is a view firmly rooted in traditional
liberal thought, the principles of which are individuality, rationality, and
self-interest.
A. Liberal Pluralism
According to the axioms of liberal thought, each owner of
capital' (either directly or through managers) pursues a profitable return
on his or her investment while each member of the non-capital class
(worker) sells his or her labour. Because these two activities are
motivated by self-interest they are seen as equivalent or parallel. This
arrangement might be considered unobjectionable, except for the fact
that the relationship between these two groups is not always balanced.
"[C]apital dominates over labour."2 As a result of this imbalance, labour
relations are inherently volatile.
For the owners of capital the need to address this volatility is
founded on practical considerations. Because there are more workers
I Throughout this article, the terms capital-owning class, capitalist, or empoyer refer to both
owners and managers. It is the control of capital that is significant for this article. In a large public
company, it is clearly the managers and directors, rather than the shareholders, who control the
corporate assets.
2 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London: MacMillan Press, 1975) at
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than owners, it is imprudent for capitalists to be perceived as the agents
of injustice.3 Real and perceived stability helps preserve the efficiency of
the market. To facilitate stability it is permissible for liberalism's sacred
principle of individuality to be violated, and for individual workers to
unite and bargain collectively. It is important to understand, however,
that collective bargaining does not change the basic liberal premise that
"[r]elations between employers and workers are governed by a contract
of employment which is, in theory, freely agreed between the two
parties."4
Collectively, workers are assumed to possess the economic
leverage that individual capitalists possess. The right to unite "suggests
that a balance of power prevails between capital and labour, that they
face each other as equals, otherwise any bargain struck could scarcely be
viewed as one which was 'freely' achieved."s In the liberal pluralist
system, the contract remains the predominant tool for ensuring
obligation. "The scheme provides for the enforceability of promises and
obligations after voluntarily-entered-into agreements between the
employer and the employees have been reached. The major difference
between this and the common law contract regime is that the bargaining
position of the individuals has been improved." 6
In a traditional collective bargaining regime differences between
workers and owners are considered to be reconcilable.
The general picture of industrial relations that could be drawn from this pluralistic
approach is one which, though hardly free of conflict, contains mechanisms enabling the
contending parties, not too unevenly matched, to negotiate their mutual accommodation.
... Within this framework, employees would be assumed to see management as simply
discharging its necessary functions and receiving its rewards.7
So long as these basic tenets are accepted, the control and containment
of the divergent and possibly excessive aspirations of the workers who
make up the firm is a legitimate exercise of the managerial function.
3 See H.J. Glasbeek, "Law; Real and Ideological Constraints on the Working Class" in D.
Gibson & J.K. Baldwin, eds., Law in a Cynical Society? Opinion and Law in the 1980's (Calgary:
Carswell, 1985) 282 at 284 [hereinafter "Constraints on the Working Class"]; and H.J. Glasbeek,
"TIP: Another Weapon in the Class War Waged Against Workers" (1981) 3 Can. Tax'n: J. Tax Pol'y
94 at 104 [hereinafter "TIP"].
4 Hyman, supra note 2 at 23.
5 L. Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social
Contract, 2d ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993) at 11.
6 "Constraints on the Working Class," supra note 3 at 287.
7 A. Fox, Man Mismanagement, 2d ed. (London: Hutchinson Education, 1985) at 30.
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In addition to providing a mechanism for remedying the
reconcilable conflicts of the labour market, collective bargaining is
believed to facilitate a democratic approach to industrial relations
conflict resolution. It does so in two ways. First, collective bargaining
allows for the resolution of conflicts through reason and negotiation.
The self-interested motivation of the parties, without the imposition of
higher authority, is believed to lead to optimal results. Collective
bargaining legislation simply sets out a process without establishing any
substantive requirements for the agreements reached.8 "[C]ollective
bargaining legislation is not unlike minimum standards' legislation: it
ensures that working conditions will not drop below certain levels, but
does so not by specifying those levels but rather by creating more
bargaining equivalence than would otherwise have existed." 9 The
Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) has stated that as long as the
parties bargain in good faith, "the collective agreement which they
ultimately reach, or whether they conclude any collective agreement at
all, must ultimately depend upon the ability and the economic power
which they can bring to bear in bargaining."' 0
The second way in which collective bargaining is seen to facilitate
a democratic approach to industrial relations conflict resolution is in
protecting the right of free association.1 1 "[T]he distinction between a
democratic or authoritarian capitalist regime is never only one of voting
rights. It is equally ... a distinction which rests on the absence or
presence of freedom of association." 12
B. Power and Control
What is wrong with the liberal pluralist conception of industrial
relations and with collective bargaining as the method for regulating
these relations? The answer is that liberal pluralism and the ensuing
mechanism of collective bargaining fails to recognize adequately the
relevance of power and control to the labour dynamic. Yet these
concepts are critical to understanding labour relations and the law that
8 See A. Forrest, "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power" (1986) 41 Relations industrielles
840 at 842 [hereinafter "Bargaining Units"].
9 "Constraints on the Working Class," supra note 3 at 287.
10 Fashion Craft Kitchens Inc. v. UBCJA, Local 3054, [1979] OLRB Rep. 967 at 970.
11 See S. Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labour Law and Political Theory (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) at 182.
12 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 8.
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governs them. The following section defines the meaning of power as it
applies to labour relations. It is this concept that underlies the
discussion of industrial relations in the rest of the article.
Power, in the context of industrial relations, is "the ability of an
individual or group to control his (their) physical and social
environment; and as part of this process, the ability to influence
decisions which are and are not taken by others."' 3 Control can be
effected by means of both material and ideological resources.
Disproportionate ownership of physical resources amounts to material
control. Ideological control refers to the capacity to influence general
beliefs and values to effect a desired result. Combined, the two aspects
of power are "the ability to overcome opposition ... [and a] perhaps even
more significant form of power, ... the ability to preclude opposition
from even arising-simply because those subject to a particular type of
control do not question its legitimacy or can see no alternative."1 4 More
needs to be said about both aspects of power.
In a capitalist society work is organized in accordance with the
exigencies of the marketplace. It is thus the owners or managers of
capital who determine the conditions under which workers satisfy their
material needs. As a practical matter, in order to meet their material
needs, workers must sell their labour to the owners of capital. Labour is
thus only one of a variety of expenses that the capitalist must incur and
manage to generate a profit. The overriding authority in day-to-day
work relations therefore belongs to employers and managers. "The
concentrated economic power of capital ... lies at the root of the right of
managerial initiative through which the employer commands while the
workers are expected to obey. Hence there exists a 'natural' structure of
one way control over production and thus over the work activities of
ordinary employees."' 5 Because the capitalist has the prerogative to
manage the business enterprise in pursuit of profit, the contract of
employment in effect requires that "[tihe worker surrenders control over
his labour."' 6 It follows from this that material constraints on the
freedom of workers to negotiate a beneficial contract inhere in the
capitalist, or market, society.
It is important to recognize the extent to which employers can
exercise control over employees by virtue of their monopolistic
13 Hyman, supra note 2 at 26.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. at 64.
16 Ibid. at 96.
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ownership (as a class) of material resources. Direct material control,
however, is merely an aspect of the power that capital exercises over
workers. Physical control operates in conjunction with ideological
control. The concept of ideology, as used here, refers to the way
perceptions of reality are generated and perpetuated.
If physical/material domination was the only kind of power at the
disposal of the capitalist class, then it would not be long before the
existing social order collapsed. To effect obedience to a social order in
which the vast majority of people are at a disadvantage, capitalists would
ultimately have to employ force and violence. But no order can rely on
physical coercion alone to maintain stability. No physical power is
omnipotent or omnipresent; circumstances can always be found when it
can be evaded with impunity.
To preserve the existing social order people need to obey
something greater than physical power. People need to obey a personal
and internalized morality from which they cannot escape. Obedience
must be made possible without force; force should only be used to
support obedience. The relationship between personal obedience and
external force is explained by Alan Fox:
We are ... threatened with detection and punishment if we rob banks. But if authority
relied on this expediency argument alone the numbers of those who fancied their chances
of evading detection would probably rise. We are taught, therefore, that it is also morally
wrong to rob banks. With a combination of these two arguments authority hopes to keep
us under control.1 7
The ideology, or personal morality, that supports existing labour
relations relies on separating or fragmenting the relationships and
interconnections of various social phenomena that affect the workplace.
Specifically, the prevailing ideology rejects the interconnectedness of
social, political, and economic phenomena. "The separation of form
from substance, process from policy, role from theory and practice,
echoes and reechoes at each level of the regime ... -18 This is at the
root of fragmentation.
It is important to understand the concept of fragmentation
because "Itihere is perhaps no greater obstacle to socialist practice than
the separation of economic and political struggles which has typified
modern working class movements. ... This 'structural' separation may,
17 Fox, supra note 7 at 39.
18 C.A. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635 at 656.
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indeed, be the most effective defense mechanism available to capital."19
Fragmentation binds the working class to capitalism's perception of
reality and makes the separation of economics from politics appear
objective and natural. "The tenacity of working class 'economism' ...
derives precisely from its correspondence to the realities of capitalism
and the ways in which capitalist appropriation and exploitation actually
do divide the arenas of economic and political action."20
Separating industrial relations from their economic and political
context makes them appear apolitical. For liberalism, the "powers of
surplus appropriation and exploitation do not rest directly on relations
of juridical or political dependence but are based on a contractual
relation between 'free' producers ... . The struggle over appropriation
appears not as a political struggle but as a battle over the terms and
conditions of work."21 Thus, industrial conflicts are regarded not as
political or social struggles but as differences belonging to the workplace
alone.
In contrast, a more holistic theory sees "relations of domination,
as rights of property, as the power to organize and govern production
and appropriation."22 To grasp the dynamic of power and domination
the interrelation of politics and economics must be acknowledged. As
discussed fully in Part III, below, the greatest problem with bargaining
unit certification is that it is a manifestation of fragmentation; it
separates the industrial structure from the political, the discourse of
justice from the practice necessary to achieve it, and the individual
worker from the entirety of workers.
C. The Role of the State in Labour Relations
According to classical liberal thought, the state should be as
unintrusive as possible, serving merely to facilitate the orderly operation
of the market. State activity should be confined to the public sphere,
which is fragmented from the private one. The argument advanced in
this section is that the state, in practice, has not adhered to the classical
liberal image. It has actually intervened to preserve the operation of the
19 E.M. Wood, "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism" (1981) 127
New Left Rev. 66 at 67.
20 Ibid.
2 1 Ibid. at 81, 92.
22 Ibid. at 77.
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market. This intervention, however, has remained largely unseen. This
is because state involvement, in both the public and the private spheres,
that facilitates the profitability of capital, is seen as neutral and
objective. In contrast, state intervention that actively engages in wealth
redistribution and restructuring of industrial relations would not be seen
as neutral and objective. Among other things, such activity would seem
to involve the state in the private realm of the market where, according
to liberal thought, the state's participation should be limited to
overseeing orderly behaviour.
To claim that the power of government is usually utilized to
preserve and promote the interests of the capital-controlling class is not
to suggest that our elected representatives or members of the judiciary
collude in a mendacious sham. There is, however, an amazing harmony
between the broad social objectives pursued by mainstream politicians
and the goals that capitalists advocate. There are two reasons for this.
First, as has already been suggested, perceptions of what is socially
desirable are subtly dictated by the market. "'Economic stability' is the
precondition of all other goals which government pursues, whatever
their political complexion. ... this inevitably entails the stability of a
capitalist economy. Hence private profit ... [is] the barometer of
economic 'health."' 23 Second, business interests have more resources at
their disposal for influencing government action. The ways in which the
owners of capital influence state intervention include "expensive
lobbying activities of major companies, the close relationship of
industrialists with politicians and civil servants, [and] the accepted role
of businessmen within many of the decision-making institutions of the
state."24
What are the traditional labour policy goals pursued by the
state? Historically, the state has attempted to regulate labour relations
in such a way as to "moderate and contain class conflict." 25 Labour law
has aimed at stabilizing the volatility latent in industrial relations. "[A]
lessening of industrial conflict is often cited as a benefit, ... a benefit
which government officials are likely to view as a positive influence on
23 Hyman, supra note 2 at 125.
2 4 ibid. at 124-25.
25 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 8.
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productivity, the economy generally, and the labour-relations climate of
the jurisdiction." 26
On one level, labour law has sought to moderate and contain
class conflict by granting workers the right to exercise the strength of
their collective numbers, and then subtly eviscerating the strength of this
unity. On another level, governments have taken an approach that more
directly evidences the intimacy between state and capital.
Many contradictions that are difficult to eradicate have revealed
themselves in capitalist society. Consequently, there have been "ongoing
efforts of capital to restructure itself, in the face of the enduring
economic crisis and the heightened international competition integral to
it."2 7 John O'Grady observed that "an entirely competitive or
unregulated labour market generates inequality. It thereby imposes
additional burdens on the state's redistributive programs." 28 An
implication of this is that in the present era there is great potential for
the volatility latent in industrial relations to erupt and rupture the
precarious imbalance between owners of capital and workers. The state
deals with this by subsidizing private capital.29 This involves supporting
the activities of capital and providing palliatives for workers. The
relationship between capital and the state is thus quite intimate. Rather
than accommodating the needs of workers, the state has selected the
option of catering to the needs of capital.
Canadian labour law has succeeded in lessening industrial
conflict by providing workers with some tangible gains, and then
circumscribing those gains. Canadian labour codes are modeled on the
American Wagner Act.30 Privy Council Order 1003 31 -the Rand
Formula-for the first time legally recognized unions and guaranteed
collective bargaining. At the time, this was truly a victory for labour. In
1946 Justice Rand wrote the following:
26 J.C. Anderson, "The Structure of Collective Bargaining" in J.C. Anderson & M.
Gunderson, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada (Toronto: Addison Wesley, 1982) 173 at
183.
2 7 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 4.
28 j. O'Grady, "Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?" in D. Drache, ed., Getting on Track:
Social Democratic Strategies for Ontario (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992) 153 at
161.
2 9 See Hyman, supra note 2 at 132.
3 0 National Labor Relations Act of 1935,29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) [hereinafter WagnerAct].
31 P.C. 1003, Canada Wartime Orders and Regulations, Wartime Labour Relations Regulations,
1944. 1.849.
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Certainly the predominance of capital against individual labour is unquestionable; and in
mass relations, hunger is more imperious than passed dividends. ... [Tihe power of
organised labour, the necessary co-partner of capital, must be available to redress the
balance of what is called social justice; the just protection of all interests in an activity
which the social order approves and encourages.3 2
In the 1940s workers secured an apparent gain by winning the
right to bargain collectively. The prevailing legal regime has, however,
given this right a narrow meaning. Professor Harry Glasbeek observed
that "[tihe legal system ... has created a scheme which stays as close to
the individual contract-making model as is consonant with the grant of
some collective rights. Hence the 'one employer-one unit of
employees' context." 33 As in all contractual negotiation, this scheme
ensures that the strong prevail. Thus, while the scheme purports to give
workers an advantage, it simultaneously limits this advantage by
ensuring that employers maintain many of the privileges they have in
ordinary contract law.
In the Rand Formula the granting of rights is apparent; the
limitation of these rights is more covert. It is this combination of what is
visible and what is not that serves to legitimate the system. The
determination of bargaining units for the purpose of certification
evidences this situation. Professor Judy Fudge described the
relationship between bargaining unit determination and certification:
The bargaining unit defines the constituency of employees from which a union must
obtain majority support in order to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of those
employees for collective bargaining purposes. It also defines the group of employees
which can engage in collective action for the purposes of collective bargaining.3 4
On their face, bargaining-unit requirements appear to be neutral. Like
rules of the road, they seem to be requirements for the orderly operation
of collective bargaining.
In what way is the determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit not a neutral and benign form of state intervention? How does it
impair the voluntariness of the actors, a feature that is so cherished by
liberal pluralism? The response is that "government policies exert a
tremendous influence on the shape of bargaining structures. This
happens ... through the criteria established for determining the scope
32 Quoted in Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 11.
33 "Constraints on the Working Class," supra note 3 at 293.
34 J. Fudge, "The Gendered Dimension of Labour Law: Why Women Need Inclusive
Unionism and Broader-based Bargaining" in L. Briskin & P. McDermott, eds., Women Challenging
Unions: Feminism, Democracy, and Militancy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 231 at
233.
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and composition of appropriate bargaining units ... ."35 Because the
bargaining unit is the basic structural element in the Canadian collective
bargaining system, the way that it is formed is determinative of how
much power it can exert. In Kidd Creek Mines Ltd., the OLRB stated that
bargaining units are "obviously of immense practical importance, not
only for the immediate parties, but for the structure and performance of
the collective bargaining system as a whole;" how a unit is determined
dictates its success in certification and "affects the bargaining power of
the union and the point of balance it creates with that of the
employer."36
The fact that bargaining units affect the balance of power
between employers and employees does not necessarily have negative
implications for organized labour. Unions have been affected adversely
because of the particular way in which the bargaining unit has been
determined. It has been determined in a way that fragments the
organization of labour. The way that fragmentation in certification
influences the power of the bargaining unit, and the consequent effects
that this has on the ability of organized labour to influence the owners of
capital is the subject of the next part of the article.
III. CERTIFICATION: A STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION
In reviewing specific methods employed by the state in securing
its labour relations objectives, the previous section concluded by
suggesting that fragmentation of organized labour is an important
feature of collective bargaining law. This part of the article attempts to
explain why this is so and what the role of certification is in this process.
A. Conformity to Capitalist Forms of Organization
The proposition advanced here is that the structure of organized
labour is shaped by the employer, and the existing labour law regime
supports the employer's power in this regard. Before discussing the way
in which certification permits the employer to have the upper hand in
collective bargaining, it is useful to address the stated legal criteria for
determining the bargaining unit. It is argued above that the
determination of the bargaining unit is presented as nothing more than a
35 Anderson, supra note 26 at 186.
36 IBEW, Local 1687 v. Kidd Creek Mines Ltd., [1984] OLRB Rep. 481 at 494.
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set of administrative procedures for determining whether the majority of
workers in a given constituency wish to become members of a trade
union. In addition, a certified bargaining unit acquires a number of
important rights. It is, for example, protected as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the designated employees with whom the employer must
bargain fairly and in good faith.
The Ontario Labour Relations Act, 199537 (oLR&1) defines
"bargaining unit" as "a Unit of employees appropriate for collective
bargaining ... ."38 To be recognized as an "appropriate" bargaining unit
the unit must be certified by the OLRB upon application by the union.3 9
The OLRA specifically provides that the OLRB "shall determine the unit of
employees appropriate for collective bargaining." 40 The OLRA prohibits a
number of activities by both parties to ensure that the entire process is
conducted fairly. The OLRB must ascertain a number of facts before
deciding on the appropriateness of the unit. Several implications flow
from the criteria used in this process.
First, the OLRB must determine whether a sufficient number of
the unit's possible members favour certification. An implication of this
is that the union must collect the requisite number of signatures from a
constituency whose size will be determined only when the OLRB
establishes what the appropriate unit is.
Second, because only "employees" as defined by the OLRB can be
members of a bargaining unit, it is important to distinguish them from
managers or other excluded categories. This has important
consequences during a strike. For example, in certain circumstances
personnel designated as "managers" may be used as replacement
workers. In determining who can become a member of a union, the
OLRB thus makes a number of important decisions on a highly
discretionary basis. There are no necessary or natural distinctions
between "manager" and "employee" in this context.
Third, the bargaining unit must be formed for the purpose of
negotiating with the employer. Under the OLRA, the authority of the
bargaining unit-or the entire union-to engage in political activity is
very limited. It is important to examine closely this particular restriction
because the relevant case law demonstrates the separation of economics
from politics under the existing regime.
3 7 S.O. 1995, c. 1, sched. A.
38 Ibid. s. 1(1).
3 9 1b1d. s. 7(1).
40 Ibid. s. 9(1).
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Political activity refers here to strikes that are not directly about
immediate economic concerns such as terms and conditions of
employment or questions about output. It is true that unions may
support political candidates financially or by direct lobbying. They are,
however, highly circumscribed in the way that they may employ the
strike in support of more strictly political objectives. This is significant
because the strike is labour's true weapon. To the extent that unions
possess any leverage, it does not emanate from collected dues. Rather,
the only measure of substance at the disposal of organized labour is the
strike.
The basic rule in Canada is that "the legal right to strike only
exists to negotiate a first or a new agreement with one employer at a
time." 4 1 The OLRA "contains a comprehensive code that prohibits
unlawful strikes, threats of unlawful strikes and behaviour intended to
encourage unlawful work stoppages." 42  Under the OLRA a "strike
remains an essential part of the process, providing a potent incentive for
the parties to settle their differences. However, it is a weapon of last
resort, and ... its use is carefully circumscribed." 43 This statutory rule
has been in effect for about half a century, replacing the previous
common law regime. The essence of the position on strikes articulated
by the OLRB is that when there is a collective agreement in place a union
may not strike.
This means that unions cannot strike to support or oppose
political candidates, parliamentary initiatives, or simply to voice a
political opinion. The statutory restriction on voicing political opinions
was demonstrated in the Days of Action cases, when organized labour in
Ontario attempted to orchestrate strikes in opposition to the policies of
Premier Mike Harris.44
The statutory scheme that both governs and circumscribes strikes
is as follows. The statutory definition of a strike according to section
1(1) of the OLRA "includes a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to
continue to work by employees in combination or in concert or in
accordance with a common understanding, or a slow-down, or other
concerted activity on the part of the employees designed to restrict or
41 D. Drache & H.J. Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace: Reshaping Canada's Industrial
Relations System (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1992) at 104.
42 Livent Inc. v. IATSE, Local58, [1996] OLRB Rep. 870 at 873 [hereinafter Livent].
43 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. CAWCanada, [1996] OLRB Rep. 409 at 435 [hereinafter
General Motors].
44 See ibid.; Livent, supra note 42; and Toronto Transit Commission v. Wilson, [1996] OLRB
Rep. 889 [hereinafter TTC].
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limit output."45 This has been the statutory definition since the first
labour relations act was passed in 1950. It is a very broad definition,
covering any refusal to work, regardless of the motivation for this
refusal. The definition encompasses a wide range of activity, including
sympathy strikes or refusing to cross a picket line, where those activities
have the effect of limiting production. 46
The OLRA expressly prohibits striking while a -collective
agreement is in effect. Section 79(1) of the OLRA states: "Where a
collective agreement is in operation, no employee bound by the
agreement shall strike and no employer bound by the agreement shall
lock out such an employee." 47 In addition to a prohibition on strikes,
the OLRA is internally consistent by prohibiting employees from
threatening to strike in section 79(6): "No employee shall threaten an
unlawful strike and no employer shall threaten an unlawful lock-out of
an employee." 48 Pursuant to section 46, the limitation on striking is
implied into every collective agreement, regardless of the actual
negotiated arrangement reached by the parties. Section 46 of the OLRA
states that "[e]very collective agreement shall be deemed to provide that
there will be no strikes or lock-outs so long as the agreement continues
to operate." 49 A limitation on the ability of labour leaders to organize
and motivate workers to take action is included in the prohibitions, as
set out in section 83: "No person shall do any act if the person knows or
ought to know that, as a probable and reasonable consequence of the
act, another person or persons will engage in an unlawful strike or an
unlawful lock-out."50
In addition to these prohibitions, the OLRA sets limitations on the
spontaneity of strikes during the period prior to or between collective
agreements. Even where a collective agreement has expired and a strike
is permissible under the OLRA, it must be delayed until the statutory
conciliation process has been completed and the employees have
authorized the strike by secret ballot. It is said that these restrictions on
the right to strike (and the supposedly parallel restrictions on the
employer's use of the lock-out) turn the collective agreement into a
45 oi.tm, supra note 37.
46 See General Motors, supra note 43 at 428.
47 oruA, supra note 37.
48 Ibid.
4 91bid.
5 0 Ibid. See also s. 100. The limits on the power and responsibility of labour leaders to avoid
strikes under the om.we were tested in Livent, supra note 42.
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mandatory peace treaty. The collective agreement is both an
undertaking and a guarantee that during its term of operation there will
be no work stoppages, occasioned either by the employer or the
employee.51
These statutory restrictions on strikes-which are thought to be
critical elements of maintaining labour harmony-were addressed in the
cases arising from the Days of Action protests. As the OLRB pointed out
in General Motors,S2 these were political protests. They involved an
attempt by a number of unions to voice a political opinion by staging
massive one-day strikes. The strikes were akin to demonstrations in that
they were not intended to change the terms and conditions of
employment, or to restrict or limit output at the facilities of the affected
employer. Indeed, the actual production losses occasioned by the work
stoppages were minimal. The stated intent of labour leaders was to
organize workers in order to manifest popular opposition to the policies
of Ontario's Conservative government.53 According to the union, the
protests were a "moderate and relatively confined collective expression
of political concern." 54 In a series of cases that emerged from these
protests the OLRB unequivocally declared that "the 'no strike prohibition'
[under the OLR] applies with equal force to so-called 'political protest
strikes' of this kind."SS
The OLRB reached this conclusion by interpreting the term
"strike" in the OLRA very broadly. Any work stoppage, even if not
directly related to collective bargaining concerns such as changes in work
conditions, is a strike. This broad interpretation has the effect of
subjecting to the restrictive rules of the OLRA all organized discontent
and protest by workers. As is discussed below, the OLRA went even so far
as to hold that because strikes-including political ones-are governed
by the OLRA, any constitutional violation of expressive freedom is
justifiable.
It is interesting to examine how the OLRB reasoned that all
collective action by workers, including voicing discontent, falls under the
OLRA definition of strike. In Domglas Ltd. v. UGCW, the OLRB held that
"[t]he Act treats the work stoppage as being, in essence, an economic
weapon, and restricts its use to a certain collective bargaining situation'
51 See General Motors, supra note 43 at 435.
5 2 Supra note 43.
5 3 See ibid. at 412.
54 Ibid. at 413.
55 7TC, supra note 44 at 890.
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.*.. To avoid disruptions in production and to promote industrial
relations harmony, all work stoppages occurring outside this limited
period, whatever their underlying motive, are prohibited."56 This
passage indicates that it is for the sake of industrial harmony that the
OLRA sets out precise rules for engaging in a strike. According to the
OLRB, any collective action by workers that threatens industrial harmony
should be subject to the rules set out in the OLRA. It is workers,
therefore, who must sacrifice important freedoms for the sake of
industrial harmony.
Domglas is a predecessor to the Days of Action cases. It arose
out of labour's opposition to the federal government's passage of wage
and price controls in 1975. This legislation also placed restrictions on
the scope of collective bargaining. The nature of the protest in Domglas
was, therefore, very similar to the circumstances giving rise to the Days
of Action cases. In the Days of Action cases, beginning with the General
Motors case, the OLRB adopted its reasoning in Domglas.57 In addition to
interpreting strike in the broadest way possible go as to ensure an
expansive reach for the statute, the OLRB determined the status of
political protest strikes under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.5 8 The OLRB held that while the impugned protests were
protected expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, prohibiting
political strikes was justifiable under section 1 of the Charter.
To support this holding the OLRB relied on the Supreme Court
labour trilogy.5 9 In these three cases the Supreme Court determined
that the right to strike was not constitutionally protected as section 2(d)
"freedom of association." Relying on the labour trilogy, the OLRB in
General Motors held that "if the underlying law does not involve any
breach of the Charter, it is difficult to accept that the Charter gives
special protection to a strike that contravenes that law as a form of
political protest or civil disobedience."60
This reasoning confounds two unrelated constitutional rights. If
the right to strike is not constitutionally protected, then, according to the
OLRB, neither is the political expression of strikers protected. The
56 [1976] OLRB Rep. 569 at 573-74; aff'd (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter
Doinglas].
57 See General Motors, supra note 43 at 434.
58 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
59 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v.
Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and Saskatchewan v. RWDSU, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
60 General Motors, supra note 43 at 443.
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suggestion that because one constitutional right is not triggered another
independent constitutional right is therefore not triggered is untenable.
It is true that the labour trilogy determined that there is no
constitutionally protected right to strike. This, however, should have no
bearing on whether expression by means of a strike is constitutionally
protected. As mentioned above, the OLRA prohibits strikes with a view to
securing industrial harmony; and it does so by restricting strikes in
situations where they are used as a "weapon." Weapon refers to the
imposition of economic sanctions on the employer. The OLRA, however,
does not purport to restrict strikes when they are used as an expressive
activity. Nor could the OLRA do so: if the OLRA had a provision
prohibiting strikes for the reason that they amount to expression, then
that provision of the OLRA would be invalid under section 2(b) of the
Charter. This is effectively what was at issue in General Motors. But the
OLRB simply failed to address the principal constitutional question at
issue: can a strike be protected by section 2(b)? The question that the
OLRB should have answered was whether the OLRA impermissibly
restricted the right to expression. And the expression here is the most
sacred under the Charter. political opinion. The OLRB's difficulty in
accepting that the Charter gives special protection to a strike that
contravenes that law as a form of political protest or civil disobedience is
contrary to the Charter. This is precisely what the Charter aims to do:
invalidate state action that impermissibly restricts a protected
constitutional right.
Beyond the restrictions just described, there are few statutory
provisions for the determination of a bargaining unit. It is the discretion
of the OLRB that is determinative. The most important single criterion is
the "community of interest."61 The OLRB considers six factors in
deciding whether the requisite community of interest exists:
1. nature of the work performed;
2. conditions of employment;
3. skills of employees;
4. administration;
5. geographical circumstances;
6. functional coherence and interdependence.62
61 Fudge, supra note 34 at 234.
62 j. Sack, C.M. Mitchell & S. Price, Ontario Labour Relations Board Law and Practice, vol. 1,
3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) at § 3.235.
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All are within the control of the employer. While these criteria are not
prescribed by statute, they have been applied as though they were,
thereby injecting an element of certainty into the certification process
and ensuring some uniformity.63
The first way in which certification ensures that union structure
conforms to the demands of capital is by making it possible for
managerial decisions about the allocation of resources to become the
basis of bargaining unit determination. "The factory, mine, yard or
office is the framework of the relationship with the employer: his
property, his concentrated power, his underlying authority exists behind
every negotiation." 64 If industrial relations are to be seen as a war, then
it is a war that takes place on the employer's chosen battleground.65
Unions have accepted this situation. "For the most part, [unions]
acknowledge management's right to organize and control the work
process." 66 The decisions which are most crucial to the determination of
the bargaining unit concern the size, shape, location, and structure of the
place where the business enterprise will be carried out. These decisions
are controlled exclusively by the employer.
The individual firm is therefore the essential basis of the
bargaining unit. "A common employer creates a community of
interest." 67 Canadian collective bargaining legislation "requires that the
collective agreement be struck on behalf of a bargaining unit of
employees, comprising a number of the employees of one common
employer."68 In fact, even smaller production structures, organized
within the firm, may constitute the basis of the bargaining unit. Because
such smaller units fragment union structure to an even greater extent,
this only strengthens the arguments developed below. Thus, for the sake
of simplicity, the firm will be discussed as the essential organizational
unit.
It is perhaps stating the obvious to say that any organized effort
to effect specific results is contingent on the ability of the involved
parties to structure how they will proceed. Preventing organized labour
from being master of its own structure has served to undermine the
63 See "Bargaining Units," supra note 8 at 848.
64 Hyman, supra note 2 at 170.
65 See ibid.
66 A. Forrest, "The Rise and Fall of National Bargaining in the Canadian Meat-Packing
Industry"(1989) 44 Relations industrielles 393 at 400 [hereinafter "Meat Packing"].
67,,Bargaining Units," supra note 8 at 846.
68
"Constraints on the Working Class," supra note 3 at 289 [emphasis added].
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bargaining power that collective bargaining legislation apparently
guaranteed to unions:
Bargaining power is often discussed as though it were a naturally occurring, fixed entity,
unaffected by public policy. In fact, however, the law does much to shape the power of
the parties. The OLRB's small units fragment the work force and make sanctions less
effective. Lawful sympathetic action is almost impossible; attempts by other groups to act
in support are quickly met by a finding of a illegal strike.69
An important implication flows from employing the firm as the
basis of bargaining unit determination. By making the demarcations of
the firm the criteria of bargaining unit size and structure, certification
ensures that negotiation occurs at the workplace level as determined by
the employer. Consequently, collective bargaining is decentralized.
Bargaining occurs between each individual employer and the employees
organized at that workplace. There is no special reason for bargaining
to occur at this level. The choice is arbitrary. Bargaining could be more
broadly based. For example, it could be conducted at an industry or
regional level. Such broader based bargaining is practiced in various
market economies outside North America. John O'Grady posited that
there is a specific reason for decentralized bargaining in North America:
The definition of "appropriate bargaining units" is fundamental to the way in which the
Wagner Act model allocates economic power in the labour market. The model presumes
that bargaining will not occur at the sectoral or regional level. ... Collective bargaining in
the Wagner Act model was to be decentralized to the smallest practical unit, namely, a
single workplace.70
The suggestion here is that conducting bargaining at the workplace level
is once again meant to fragment and thus undermine union power.
How does decentralized bargaining undermine union power?
Negotiation at the level of the workplace is the primary reason that
workers cannot take advantage of their numerical superiority over the
owners and managers of capital and their managerial functionaries. This
incapacity operates on two levels. First, workers in one bargaining unit
cannot exercise economic sanctions against their employer in support of
action taken by another unit. 71 Such supportive behaviour by workers is
prohibited even if the different bargaining units belong to the same
union. This is so unless there is such a close link between the different
bargaining units "that they are in fact, if not in law, interrelated
69 "Bargaining Units," supra note 8 at 848.
70 O'Grady, supra note 28 at 157-58 [emphasis in original].
71 See "Constraints on the Working Class," supra note 3 at 293.
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enterprises."72 Thus, segmenting union structure to parallel the division
amongst capitalist enterprises is an ostensible barrier to solidarity
amongst workers in the whole society.
The second impediment to the mobilization of workers caused by
workplace bargaining is that some workplaces are small and poorly
organized in comparison to bargaining units at large resource-based
manufacturing plants. In the former situation the bargaining unit is not
sufficiently strong to exert any meaningful pressure on the employer.
"Units of this size, powerless almost by definition, are the product of the
Ontario Board's preference for a highly fragmented structure of
recognition. Each establishment is considered a natural bargaining
constituency: the 'single-employer, single-location, single-plant unit' is
the cornerstone of OLRB policy." 73
The weakness of small bargaining units is exacerbated by three
factors. First, the cost to unions of representing small workplaces is an
obstacle.74 The dues base is too small to cover bargaining costs for the
central union organization. Second, "[t]he cumulative impact of
collective bargaining is nullified by the high attrition rate of small
employers."7S Union success is felt over time, but 50 per cent of firms
employing less than twenty workers in the period 1978-86 ceased
operation. Third, because small firms exist in more competitive
industries than larger ones, profits are lower, and consequently unions
have less to gain.76 These factors pose particular problems for the
current union movement because there has been a trend towards small
firms in recent decades.77
The power of workers in small firms is further constrained by the
fact that they are very difficult to organize.7S Despite the oLRA's unfair
labour practice provisions, employers' resistance to certification is more
effective in small workplaces. O'Grady provided two reasons for this.7 9
First, while the dismissal of union organizers is illegal, it can be
effectively used in small workplaces to impede an organizing drive at a
72 Ibid.
73 "Bargaining Units," supra note 8 at 844-45.
74 See O'Grady, supra note 28 at 160.
75 Ibid at 160-61.
7 6 See ibid. at 161.
77 See "Bargaining Units," supra note 8 at 844-45.
78 See O'Grady, supra note 28 at 164-65.
79 Ib at 159-60.
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crucial moment, when it is most vulnerable. Second, employers can
strategically exercise their right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by
section 70 of the OLRA, in small workplaces to dissuade employees from
signing union cards. "Managers always have the ability to influence a
handful of workers."8 0 The advantages of influencing small groups of
employees were apparent to management in K-Mart Canada Ltd. v.
SEIU, Local 183,81 where the employer intentionally communicated with
employees in small groups in order to weaken union support.
In concluding the discussion of how certification ensures that
union structure conforms to the production decisions of employers, it is
relevant to highlight the flexibility of the system. The bargaining unit
need not be determined on the basis of the firm, nor does collective
bargaining need to be decentralized. When excessive fragmentation or
decentralization are considered damaging to the interests of employers,
they are not pursued. Two examples illustrate this argument. First, it
must be remembered that the ultimate objective of labour relations
regulation is to stabilize and order the market. Excessively small units
may on occasion severely inconvenience some firms. Thus, "while
wanting to ensure that units do not get so large that they could cause
serious disruptions, [labour relations boards] do not want them so small
... that an employer will have to deal with a multiplicity of unions."8 2
This was the view expressed in CUPE v. Toronto (City) Board of
Education:
[Aln employer faced with the possibility of lengthy, protracted and expensive bargaining
and the further possibility of jurisdictional disputes among multiple bargaining groups
represented by one or more trade unions may find it impossible to carry on a viable and
meaningful collective bargaining relationship .... [I]n those circumstances the board will
find the unit proposed inappropriate .... 83
The message is unambiguous: fragmentation is flexible. When it is
beneficial to employers' concerns, fragmentation can be reduced.
The second example of employers' ability to manipulate the
extent of fragmentation to suit their needs concerns the decentralization
of bargaining. Despite the benefit that capital derives from
decentralized bargaining, centralized bargaining may sometimes be
beneficial to firms. The specific circumstances in which this may occur
8 0 lbid at 160.
81 [1981] OLRB Rep. 60.
82 "TIP," supra note 3 at 106.
83 [1970] OLRB Rep. 430 at 436.
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are not directly related to the present discussion. The importance of this
observation is that the extent of centralization is not fixed:
The variety and generality of factors [considered by the OLRB in bargaining unit
determination] means that a good deal of flexibility is built into standard-unit
determination, even though this is hidden from view because so many cases seem
unproblematic. The boards make their determinations on a case-by-case basis and the
criteria used to give the "community-of-interest" concept life permit them to tailor
bargaining units.84
In short, centralization may vary within the Canadian collective
bargaining scheme. And the power to do so rests in the hands of
employers and is enforced by the relevant labour relations board. In
other words, the fact that collective bargaining is generally decentralized
is the intended consequence of the owners of capital. "[B]oth unions
and employers will push towards the centralization of the bargaining
structures [but] only to the point that the structure matches the market
structure in which the firm operates."8s In her study of the Canadian
meat-packing industry, Anne Forrest explained that so long as the
industry was organized as an oligopoly, the participating firms benefited
from industry-wide bargaining. However, when the owners' situation
changed, they had the power to decentralize the bargaining process.8 6 In
the meat-packing industry it was the owners rather than the workers who
had a decisive impact on the extent of centralization in that industry.
B. Narrowness
Conformity to the imperatives of capital influences the strategies
that unions employ in seeking improvements for workers. Divided into
small hierarchically structured units like business enterprises, unions
accept that gains are best achieved through cooperation, conciliation,
and accommodation. It is not suggested that cooperation, conciliation,
and accommodation are to be avoided. Rather, the proposition
advanced here is that unions come to see the collective agreement in the
same light as any other contract struck between entrepreneurs. Thus,
organized labour accepts the structure of capitalism and thereby
legitimates it. Only those demands are sought that can be
accommodated without doing serious violence to the profit motive of
84 Drache & Glasbeek, supra note 41 at 73-74.
85 Anderson, supra note 26 at 186 [emphasis added].
86 See generally "Meat Packing," supra note 66.
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employers. The implication of this is that certification facilitates the
predominance of the capital-controlling class in industrial relations by
influencing the strategies that unions deploy in seeking improvements
for workers.
There is no necessary or natural limitation on the strategies that
unions may employ to advance the interests of workers. Since workers
constitute the vast majority of the population, unions could conceivably
employ at least two methods. First, in a democracy it should be open to
organized labour to engage in non-violent techniques for effecting
desired results. This route has secured certain tangible gains for
workers. It has not, however, resulted in reshaping industrial relations
to give workers greater democratic participation in the workplace.
Another option is violent opposition to the existing order. This method
has generally not been used. The reason that neither of these methods
have been instrumental in reshaping industrial relations is the lack of
class consciousness among workers. Workers lack a sufficient
appreciation of their social condition, of their commonality, and of the
power of their unity. In view of this absence of consciousness and the
structural constraints on unions occasioned by fragmentation, organized
labour has sought gains through cooperation, conciliation, and
accommodation;
The conciliatory option means that unions regard collective
agreements as part of the classic contract model. This is precisely the
view of collective agreements that capital advocates. In a market
economy, labour must pay for any gains that it secures. This is a basic
precept of contract law. Consideration must be given in exchange for
the benefit of a contract. "[I]n a private enterprise economy labour as a
class ... has to pay for whatever gains a specific labour organization may
enjoy, 'responsible' leadership in a union, 'business-like' behaviour, and
collusion and oligarchic distribution of decisive power come up to the
same [thing]."8 7 In order to purchase gains, unions abide by the rules of
the system and limit the scope of their demands. The union and
management become partners in a market transaction. This, however, is
not an equal partnership. Underlying relations between unions and
employers is the reality such that unions are tolerated so long as they
stay within the law, which, as previously discussed, is a product of the
intimate relationship between the state and capital.88
87 R. Herding, "Job Control and Union Structure" in T. Clarke & L. Clements, eds., Trade
Unions Under Capitalism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978) 260 at 260 [footnotes
omitted].
88 See "TIP," supra note 3 at 104, n. 41.
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Two consequences flow from the above characterization of
organized labour's understanding of its position in industrial relations
and the consequent use of the conciliatory approach. First, unions
narrow their expectations and demands to the realm of what can be
achieved within the existing social and industrial order. Ultimately, this
means wages are virtually the exclusive area of union concern. The
second consequence of the conciliatory approach is that unions become
partners in the capitalist regime. By so doing, unions assist in
perpetuating the existing distribution of power in industrial relations.
Unions thus serve as a mechanism in the capitalist industrial relations
framework. This function can be described as the management of
workers' discontent.8 9
What are the implications 'of the fact that wage increases
constitute the dominant concern of union activity? The response is that
when unions occupy themselves strictly with wage improvements they
tacitly accept the separation of economics from politics. This means that
unions seek improvements in rates of remuneration and apply no real
pressure to effect structural changes. Ultimately, it becomes difficult to
raise wider control issues in any meaningful way if the framework of a
capitalist market is implicitly accepted by the very activity of compromise
economic bargaining.
What exactly is it that the union accepts and ignores when it
bargains about wage increases? The following passage contains a helpful
response:
Trade unions strive to effect marginal improvements in the lot of their members and to
defend them against arbitrary management action. They do not ... attack management
on such basic principles of the social and industrial framework as private property, the
hierarchical nature of the organization, the extreme division of labour, and the massive
inequalities of financial reward, status, control and autonomy in work.90
Confining demands to that which management can accommodate within
the scope of profit-motivated activity allows unions to score victories on
these narrow issues. In other words, unions are rewarded by
management for being cooperative. In turn, the extent to which union
policies can be accommodated within capitalism encourages continued
moderation.
Inside the constricted parameters of the accepted framework,
demands for wages and particular immediate grievances constitute the
short list of issues that can be accommodated. Any broader demands
89 See discussion accompanying footnotes 100-109, infra.
90 Fox, supra note 7 at 6 [emphasis added].
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would challenge the existing structure of industrial relations. There
tends to be a fixed amount of work-control available for distribution, and
for one party to increase control the other must necessarily lose some of
its control. Leaving all issues with the exception of immediate concerns
and wages to management means that rather than initiate changes,
unions react to the behaviour of capital. Unions do not try "to secure a
foothold in the majority of decisions made within the organization on
such issues as management objectives, markets, capital investment, and
rate of expansion. Very rarely do they seriously challenge such
principles as the treatment of labour as a commodity to be hired or
discarded at management's convenience." 91 Thus, Forrest observed that
"[m]anagerial control was never seriously in jeopardy in Canada. By the
time mass-production industries were unionized in the 1940s, the work
process had been reorganized. Industrial unions sought to modify, but
did not challenge, innovations like time and motion study, job ladders,
and incentive pay."92
Another consequence of limiting bargaining objectives to raising
wages and aspects of the immediate job environment is the growth of
legalism in labour relations. The narrow concerns of unions direct their
efforts "away from mobilizing and organizing, and toward the juridical
arena of the labour boards." 93 Instead of regarding collective bargaining
as a temporary compromise until the balance of forces shifts, "union
officials [come] to see it as a more or less permanent, normal and
desirable state of affairs." 94 Union leaders thus become experts in
rights, procedures, and precedents. With the growth of collective
bargaining "the trade union negotiator increasingly became a specialist
in quasi-legal documents and contracts, and in commercial calculations
about wages, production costs, profits and the like."95 Because the
existing state of the law does not favour unions, however, operating
within the legal sphere virtually precludes substantive change.
Legalism is also reinforced by a collective bargaining structure
that is concerned with procedure rather than substance. The
fragmentation in thought that separates procedure from substance is
instrumental in diverting attention from substantive change to
procedural tinkering. In this context, "union rights appear as privileges
91 Ibid. at 33.
92 "Meat Packing," supra note 66 at 400.
93 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 19.
94 J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics (New York: Verso, 1988) at 57.
95 Ibid. at 56.
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bestowed by the state, rather than democratic freedoms won, and to be
defended by, collective struggle." 96
In addition to influencing the tactics which unions employ in
their relations with employers, legalism shapes the internal structure of
unions. Thus, "[t]he trade unionism which developed in Canada during
the post-war years bore all the signs of the web of legal restrictions which
enveloped it. Its practice and consciousness were highly legalistic and
bureaucratic, and therefore, its collective strength limited."97 The result
of both aspects of legalism is that any potential "rank and file militancy
... [is] channeled to a legalistic process completely controlled by the
union staff, elected union officials, and the entire repressive and
ideological state apparatuses."98
Like the narrowing of bargaining objectives to improvements in
wages, the argument that unions serve as a mechanism in the prevailing
regime also flows from unions' understanding of themselves as partners
with management in the industrial relationship between employers and
employees. In certain circumstances, the extent to which unions regard
themselves as partners with management in a common enterprise is very
apparent. "On occasion, individual unions will ally with the employers
of their ... members to seek further governmental protection for their
continued existence." 99 Parties to a contract with capital, unions come
to be concerned about the subject of their bargain: broadly, this means
the existing state of industrial relations. In order for unions to operate
within the collective bargaining system, they must develop a commitment
to the existing regime.
This tendency of unions to develop a partnership with the power
of state and capital is a result of the way that unionism developed in
accord with the structure of capital. It is also a result of fragmentation.
As has already been argued, "unions did not develop their
organizational forms independently of capitalism: they developed under
the formidable pressure of events and compulsions dependent upon
capitalist competition."00
An aspect of this development has been the alienation of union
members from leaders. This has been termed the problem of oligarchy.
This refers to a situation where union leaders, operating under capitalist
96 Ibid
9 7 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 20.
98 F.R. Annunziato, "Commodity Unionism" (1990) 3:2 Rethinking Marxism 8 at 27.
99 Ibid. at 28.
100 Kelly, supra note 94 at 54.
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conditions, come to behave like managers of corporations. Rather than
serving as leaders of a revolutionary movement, union leaders function
as efficient administrators and bureaucratic organizers. Trade unions
are now an expression of, rather than a challenge to, class society. 01 To
bargain effectively union leaders have needed to ensure that their
members abide by the provisions of collective agreements. To this end,
union leaders must exercise "internal discipline ... so that members
would respect agreements signed with employers." 02 The implication is
that within a collective bargaining regime union structure is
characterized by an internal tension: it is the tension caused by having to
exercise control over workers in order to exercise control for workers1 03
The partnership between unions and management assists in
binding labour to the prevailing industrial, economic, and social
structure. Unions aid in "the integration of working-class institutions
into the existing power structure. In fact it is plausible to argue that
formal unionism helps to mediate the dominant ideology to the working
class in a way that renders it acceptable."10 4  Courts have been
unambiguous in their expectation that unions are to assist in binding
workers to the imperatives of capital.105 Specifically, it is a union's
responsibility to secure stability and peace in industrial relations.
Consequently, unions are expected to take every reasonable effort to
prevent an illegal strike. As discussed above, legal strikes are defined
very narrowly. The obligation is thus on the union to ensure that narrow
economic demands are not transformed into broader political and social
conflict:
Unions in a capitalist system which they accept, serve as tools of "capitalist integration"
to channel and administrate labour protest in forms tolerable for the system ....
Imaginative reorganization of working conditions falls prey to the combined pressure of
101 p. Anderson, "The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action," in Clarke & Clements,
eds.,supra note 87, 333 at 334.
102 Ibid. at 56.
103 See Hyman, supra note 2 at 26.
104 L. Clements, "Reference Groups and Trade Union Consciousness" in Clarke & Clements,
eds.,supra note 87, 309 at 323.
105 See, for example, OCA W, Local 16-14 v. Polymer Corp. Ltd. (1958), 10 L.A.C. 31; (1959),
10 L.A.C. 51, aff'd [1961] O.R. 438 (C.A.), aff'd [1962] S.C.R. 338; Dominion Bridge Co. Ltd. v.
BSOIW, Local 786, [1983 OLRB Rep. 1801; Belmont Plastering Co. v. DALI, Local 675, CIA, [1987]
OLRB Rep. 1347; North Central Plywoods v. PPW-Canada, Local 25 (1985), 21 L.A.C. (3d) 180; and
Nfld (A.G.) v. Nfld. Association of Public Employees (1976), 12 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 495 (Nfld. S.C.).
[VOL. 36 No. 3
The Division of Labour
the centralized unions' adjustment to management's drive for individual productivity and
stable employment. 106
The state penalizes irresponsible action and creates incentives for
voluntary responsible behaviour. As has been discussed, material and
ideological power are interconnected. In this context, this means that
the stick and the carrot can be used simultaneously. "[C]oercion and
consent are not mutually exclusive state strategies." 107 An important
aspect of responsible union leadership within the existing framework is
suppressing radical and militant rank and file action. Such action is
clearly dangerous. If not contained at an early stage it can spread and
undermine existing relations. The regime creates incentives for union
leaders "to suppress any sign of spontaneous militancy ... [and] to act as
agents of social control over their members, rather than their
spokespersons and organizers."10S Legalizing unions has created an
incentive for unions to operate within the collective bargaining regime
and to develop a commitment to its maintenance. 09
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the liberal pluralist interpretation of
industrial relations offers an inadequate understanding of this subject.
Because liberal pluralism is an expression of liberal thought, many of the
assumptions that underlie its view of employee-employer interaction are
common-sensical. We therefore do not recognize them.
It has also been argued that industrial relations should be spoken
about in the language of power. Relations between worker and manager
manifest a conflict of social classes. Their relations and their conflict
extend beyond the sphere of the workplace or even the sphere of
economics. The material advantage that those who control capital enjoy
underlies their ability to influence dominant thought. An important way
in which the state serves the interests of capital is by ordering and
stabilizing the volatility that inheres in industrial relations. Collective
bargaining simultaneously gives to workers while taking away.
Certification can be understood as a tool for fragmenting the
potential power of labour's unity. It physically fragments the ability of
106 Herding, supra note 87 at 260,263.
10 7 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 5 at 43.
108 Ibid. 19-20.
109 Ibid.
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workers to unite, and it perpetuates the fragmentation in thought that
separates form from substance, economics from politics, and
consciousness from action. Certification ensures that the structure of
labour conforms to the organizational choices of capital.
